This paper formulates a strategy for assessing bias, and applies it to quantitative assessments of the disaster of war in Darfur [Sudan]. In so doing it argues for qualitative investigations of quantitative analyses. The strategy examines epistemic and political regimes with the goal of revealing the sources, the directions, and the forces of bias. Examples of bias are discussed to illustrate the strategy including, among others, the draw-a-person IQ test, questions about how old you are or whether you can bear children in Chad, and the US army's Human Terrain System. Considerable attention is paid to US governmental biasing of its claims of war fatalities and genocide in Darfur. This biasing is shown to involve cherry picking, symbolic violence, and high-channel regimes of bias. It is shown how the bias assessment strategy may be of use in evaluating moral claims.
This article may leave some a bit disappointed. They come to it hoping to discover how many have really been killed in Darfur, and some idea as to the best assessment procedures for discovering such statistics. They will not get this knowledge. Rather my position will be that prevailing political and epistemic conditions are such that quantitative estimates of matters like mortality in conflict, or in other sorts of humanitarian disasters, are likely to be profoundly biased. This means that strategies for investigating the sources of quantitative assessments' bias are equally as important as the quantitative techniques themselves. Further, I shall claim that a quantitative assessment's validity will depend, in good measure, upon qualitative investigations.
The paper thus has two labors. On the one hand, it argues for integration of qualitative with quantitative researches, thereby elucidating the qualitative in the quantitative. On the other, it advocates a strategy for the study of bias in social and cultural realms of quantitative assessment, in part by considering the disasters of war in Darfur. Argumentation proceeds by discussing the ancient debate between the partisans of qualitative versus quantitative methodologies as well as introducing a way of evaluating the bias of quantitative assessments; then it proceeds to consider sources of epistemic bias, sources of political bias, and finally a case history of political bias in Darfur. The conclusion shows what such bias analysis can mean for judgment of morality.
Assessing Reality and Its Biases
Qualitative and quantitative ways of assessing reality have emerged, have tended to be judged as dueling opposites, and have spawned roistering brawls over which is the better way of knowing.
Since Galileo Galilei's success in developing a mathematics of uniformly accelerated objects in the early 17 th century there has been a growing belief among intellectual elites that the more rigorous way to know things is quantitatively (Porter 1996) . Certain folk, usually in the humanities, have defended qualitative analyses, but such pleading has not impeded the expansion of quantitative techniques into the analysis of ever-increasing domains of reality. Let us arrive at a preliminary understanding of the qualitative and the quantitative.
There is a tendency to simplify and to reduce the former to studies whose analyzes are based upon words and the latter to those based upon numbers. This oversimplifies. The approach I take -reflecting discussions in Becker (1976) , Creswell (2003) and Kuhn (1961) -considers that there are different types of information about reality. Quantitative information is that relating to, or expressible in, terms of quantities of reality. It is the how much of being. Thus, mortality assessments that so many died are examples of quantitative data. Qualitative information is that relating to, or expressible in, terms of the qualities of reality. Of course, this provokes debate over the nature of quality; a spat that ranges from John Locke's classic (1690) distinction between primary qualities (like extension and solidity) and secondary qualities (such as color and sound) to A.J. Ayer's belief in qualia as 'sensory patterns ' (1968) . For our purposes quality is the distinguishing features of sensory patterns of being. It is the what is of phenomena, which make some chunk of being what it is. Qualitative information relevant to persons concerns a particular type of distinguishing features: the experiences of, and the meaning given to, to reality.
A distinguishing feature of mortality is that people have ceased to be alive, which requires consideration of what is meant by life. The position argued in this text is that the qualitative and quantitative are not opposing ways of knowing -one premodern and on the wane, the other modern and on the rise-but complementary components in any inquiry in which rigorous knowledge is craved. One of these realms is that of humanitarian disaster, where perhaps a key assessment is of numbers killed. Darfur -until recently a backwater among backwaters-came in the first years of the 21 st century to dominate headlines as a place of the monstrosities of war so great that some declared genocide; which is why this paper investigates Darfuri war fatalities and their bias. Let us turn to bias.
The word bias is derived from the medieval English game of bowls and referred to the actual roll of the ball on release from the clasp of some lord or lady. Sometimes the bowl would be directly at the pins. Other times it would slant in some angle away from them. 'Bias' as it is used in this discussion is knowledge with a particular slant; that is, a certain quantity of knowledge pushed in a particular direction. The magnitude of the knowledge -its generality-may be little or large.
For example, the magnitude of knowledge about war deaths is relatively smaller if it only refers only to deaths in Darfur between 2003 and 2008, and vaster if it refers to all those killed by war in all places at all times. The direction of the knowledge is the degree to which it is pushed along a particular path or, more quantitatively, along a certain measurement scale. The analysis of bias, is discovery of the reasons why a particular magnitude of knowledge exhibits a particular direction, or directions. Directions 'away from' or 'towards what' readers might ask? One answer to this question is away from or towards the approximate truth of some bit of knowledge. 2 Of particular interest are circumstances where the same quantum of knowledge exhibits multiple directions. This is precisely the sort of bias reported for the Sudanese war mortality figures -where in both cases there is one bowler pushing the knowledge in a higher direction, and another pushing it in a lower direction.
Analysis of these biases is revelation of the sources of the pushing: discovery of the forces moving knowledge in particular directions, which is knowledge of who the bowlers are and how they do it. The bowlers are 'channels of information' -actors, social or individual-that push a particular bias upon people. Epistemic and political information channels make epistemic and political forces moving knowledge in specific directions. By 'epistemic' forces I mean those that pertain to a regime of knowledge construction used by those making the knowledge. An 'epistemic regime' is any particular actor, or actors in knowledge-making institutions (comprising anything from forms of divination, to pop radio stations, to research institutes), using non-scientific and scientific procedures for constructing knowledge. By 'political' forces I mean those that pertain to groups, or collections of groups, ranging from families to states, with resources that can be utilized to oblige the construction of knowledge favorable to the interests of those groups. 'Political regimes' are actors in governmental institutions exercising their resources to force construction of desired knowledge. What makes any regime a regime is that it concerns the actions of actors in a particular institution at a political time. Regimes of bias where only a few information channels push a bias will said to be 'low channel'.
Those where a large number of information channels push a bias will be termed 'high channel'.
In any strategy assessing bias, it seems entirely sensible to employ epistemic regimes most capable of establishing approximately true knowledge to establish the approximate truth of quanta of knowledge and, then, to establish the force of bias away from that truth. Attention turns to some sources bias in epistemic regimes.
Epistemic Sources
Epistemic bias can result from a number of sources. Three these -imperfect techniques, cultural relativism, and emotive coloring-are discussed in this section. Let us begin with imperfect techniques.
Flawed techniques:
Empirical data collection and analysis methods vary in their quality and can themselves be designed (normally inadvertently) to produce information exhibiting some bias. There is a set of assessment techniques that are often utilized in disasters that are suspect for another set of reasons. These are Rapid Assessment Procedures (RAP) and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) (Scrimshaw and Gleason 1994) . They are survey methodologies that search for opinions and attitudes, behavior, and motivations of both the clients of disaster or development programs and also those who deliver services. Their questionnaires are normally generic, not specifically tailored for particular places. Sampling and administration procedures are designed to they can be performed quickly. The teams performing them normally come from somewhere else, work for a brief period (Days or weeks), and leave quickly. The teams are said to be 'parachuted in' and their research to be 'quick and dirty'. I have observed the use of such techniques for three decades, and believe they are, indeed, 'dirty'.
There are three key problems. The first has to do with the time allotted for the research. Usually this is too short. For example, I was once contacted to do a RRA concerning land tenure along the Chad/Cameroon oil pipeline. The pipeline is well over a 1000 kilometers. Questions of land tenure are notoriously difficult to gather information on because they deal with sensitive issues effecting peoples' welfare. I was to be allotted four weeks to conduct the survey. I was uncertain of whether I could travel the length of the pipeline in four weeks let alone conduct interviews. A second problem with RRAs is that the people administering them are often poorly trained. The combination of improperly trained persons plus inadequate time for them to do their jobs means that any knowledge gained tends to be biased in any number of directions, all away from the approximate truth. There is a third biasing factor with RRAs. They tend to afflicted by problems arising from cultural relativism. This, however, is basic problem and is considered in the next section.
Cultural relativity: Cultural relativity is the recognition that different peoples have different systems of meaning (i.e., cultures) so that the meaning of things is relative to the culture they are in. For example, were I now to grab my male member, and agitate it rapidly against my left thigh, it would mean that I was either crazy, sexually depraved, or both. However, were we in the Amazon forest, and were we of a group called the Nambikwara, then Lévi-Strauss (1948) informs us that my fondling would indicate, 'Hello', and politely at that. However, the reason it is case is because of the qualitative nature of the meaning of who is and who is not classified as African. This, then, is an example of the qualitative in the quantitative.
Another problem that can arise due to the ignoring of cultural relativity is that the interviewer may pose questions that in a particular culture are simply impossible to answer, for one of two reasons. The first of these is that the interviewer asks the question in a way that cannot be posed in a particular culture. For example, while conducting a demographic survey in Chad I asked, 'How old are you'?, and found in a preliminary survey that I was getting a huge number of 'do not know' responses. Then I recalled that when people spoke of their age they did it in terms of the number of dry seasons they had lived through. So I changed the query and asked, 'How many dry seasons have you been through'? After which, the number of 'do not know' responses declined. A second reason that a question may be unanswerable is that it is culturally inappropriate. For example, once I studied a group of Chadian Arabs called the Abu Krider.
They were a garrulous folk, often speaking frankly about matters about which I blanched. The knowledge they construct is biased in favor of tips on how to kill the new natives in Iraq, Afghanistan, or wherever they might be.
There are any number of ways such militarization of data collection can bias assessments.
Consider one concerning the US/Nato Campaign at Marjah in Afganistan [February-March 2010] . This region is the heartland of the Taliban, and has been so for a long time. The people are relatively prosperous. They cultivate poppies, and poppy production pays higher than any What is pertinent is that the US President was cherry picking of the level of mortality in the Iraq war by rejecting one unfavorable to his interests, thereby biasing the war fatalities in a downward direction. I believe there has been US cherry picking of the higher assessment of mortality in the Darfuri conflict. This case is made next. observation suggests that that this policy has been designed to bring war and instability to Sudan, and that one of the ways it has sought to do so is by cherry picking assessments of the fatalities in Darfur.
The Biasing of Darfur Assessments of War Mortality

Responsibility Significant when seeking understanding of US/Sudan relations is awareness that
Sudan's position -close to the Arabian Peninsula and as a backdoor to Egypt-give it a geopolitical significance. Further, its Islamist orientation is disapproved of by both US missionaries, active in Southern Sudan, and the US government. Additionally, and perhaps most crucial, oil is running out in the world; the US is warring to control as much of the remaining oil as it can; the US has identified Africa as a major source of oil in the future ( (Hassan, Salah, 2009: 156) . It is indisputable that there were widespread claims of Sudanese government genocide in the Western press, and certainly these did in part shift attention away from US and Isreali brutalities. about it, the warring of all the militaries -the janjawid, the SLA, the JEM, the Sudanese military, and even the covert hand of the US-was terrible. But the lower assessments of war fatalities, the US government's own GAO report judged, were the ones more likely to be true. Such assessments indicate grim combat but are inconsistent with genocide.
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Hilary Clinton stated that it is US policy to bring 'peace and stability' to Sudan. The actuality is that America has sowed instability first by physically violent covert global warring in Sudan;
second by symbolically violent cherry picking of the grim fatalities in Darfur; and third by participating in a high-channel regime of bias that pushed peoples' perceptions towards judgments that Sudan's government was ghastly, like the Nazi's. This being the case, America is at least in some measure responsible for the horror in Darfur that it so loudly denounced, which means the Secretary of State's assertion that the US wanted 'peace and stability' for Sudan is hypocritical. It is time to draw the strings of this discussion and speak of the qualitative in the quantitative.
7 The UN, EU, Canada, and England did not label Sudan a genocidal state. One reason for this is that the UN Genocide Convention, the legal basis for making rulings on genocide, insists that those committing it must intend to do so. The UN could not find intention on the part of the Sudanese government (Straus 2005) . American authorities were not interested in slippery subjectivities like intentionality; for them size mattered and the higher estimates provided just the right emotional jolt to shock people into believing that genocide had taken place.
Conclusion
'All research ultimately has a qualitative grounding' (Donald Campbell in Miles and Huberman 1994: 40) This article has introduced a strategy for the study of bias in social and cultural realms of quantitative assessment, and has applied it, among other places, to the disasters of war in Darfur.
The strategy asks investigators identify the sources of bias, understood as forces pushing knowledge in particular directions. Researchers were also advised to explore two sorts of biasing sources, those having to do with epistemic and political forces; with the actual exercisers of force being different epistemic and political regimes. Three epistemic sources of bias were identified.
The first was where epistemic regimes operated with imperfect techniques; the second was where they operated subject to imperfections of meaning resulting from cultural relativism; and the third was where they operated under limitations of emotive coloring. Two political sources of bias were distinguished. The first was direct, and occurred when political regimes themselves actually performed operations that resulted in biasing. The second source of political bias was indirect, and happened when resources flowed from political regimes to epistemic regimes in ways that influenced biasing. Two sorts of political/epistemic regime resource flows were discussed; those involving money and those involving intellectual resource flows. A goal, of the utilization of this strategy of bias assessment is that if investigators can know the sources of bias,
then they know what they have to eliminate, in order to achieve greater rigor in their assessments of approximate truth of actualities.
What is the relevance of this bias assessment strategy for consideration of the relationship of qualitative to quantitative inquiry? Quantitative information is that relating to, or expressible in, terms of quantities of reality. It is the different war fatality figures produced by the different epistemic regimes studying the Darfur conflict. Qualitative information is that relating to, or expressible in, terms of distinguishing features of reality, which in the case of humans pertains to the meanings they attach to things and the experiences they have of them. Of course, Donald
Campell's claim, 'All research ultimately has a qualitative grounding', is correct in the sense that concepts seeking to know about how much of some being there is ultimately are, or depend on, 
